Proving the Defendant\u27s Bad Character by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
1988 
Proving the Defendant's Bad Character 
Bennett L. Gershman 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bennett L. Gershman, Proving the Defendant's Bad Character, 11 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 477 (1988), 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/269/. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
Proving the Defendant's Bad Character 
Bennett L. Gershman t 
A prosecutor is forbidden to seek a conviction by proving that the 
defendant has a bad character. The prejudicial impact on the jury of 
the defendant's criminal or sordid background can be devastating. As 
the leading authority on evidence observed: 
The deep tendency of human nature to  punish, not because our 
victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may 
as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency which 
cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.' 
Empirical studies bear out this statement. The classic study of the 
American jury shows that when a defendant's criminal record is known 
and the prosecution's case has weaknesses, the defendant's chances of 
acquittal are thirty-eight percent, compared to sixty-five percent oth- 
erwise.* Because of the danger that jurors will assume that the defendant 
is guilty based on proof that his bad character predisposes him to an 
act of crime, the courts and legislatures have attempted to circumscribe 
the use of such evidence.3 Some prosecutors, however, although well 
7 Professor, Pace University School of Law; A.B. (1963), Princeton University; 
LL.B. (1966), New York University Law School. 
1. 1A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 8 57 (1983). 
2. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966). 
3. Compare Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and People 
v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950) with United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 
348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 
N.Y .S.2d 849 (1974). See also FED. R. EVID. 404, 608, 609; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
$ 240.43 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
This is not to  say that prosecutors are entirely foreclosed from using evidence of 
other crimes in order to prove guilt. Such evidence is admissible when relevant to an 
issue in the case, such as intent, motive, knowledge, opportunity, common scheme, 
or absence of mistake. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also United States v. Beechum, 
582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (proof of prior offense to show intent), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Gano, 560 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1977) (proof of 
prior offenses to show motive, preparation, plan, and knowledge); People v. Massey, 
196 Cal. App. 2d 230, 16 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1961) (proof of prior offenses to  show 
intent); People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817 
(proof of prior offenses to show intent), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). But see 
United States v. Roeniqk, 810 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1987) (excessive exploration of details 
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aware of the insidious effect such prejudicial evidence can have on 
jurors, violate the rules of evidence, as well as ethical standards, by 
deliberately introducing inadmissible evidence in order to obtain a 
conviction, despite the risks in~o lved .~  
Character Assassination 
A prosecutor's opportunities to attack the defendant's credibility 
through proof of prior criminal acts or other misconduct which did 
not result in a conviction are limited.5 Ordinarily, prosecutors are 
allowed to ask only questions probative of truthfulness, which are 
based on a good faith belief that prior criminal conduct occurred. 
This prior criminal conduct cannot be proved by extrinsic e~ idence .~  
Prosecutors have disobeyed this rule by portraying defendants as 
dangerous, sinister, and undesirable characters who are likely to have 
committed the crime charged or some other crime. 
A good example of a case involving such a portrayal is United 
States v. Shelton.' In Shelton, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals reversed a conviction for assaulting a federal officer on 
the ground that the prosecutor, through a series of innuendos, painted 
the defendant as a "seedy and sinister" member of the drug under- 
world. During cross-examination of the defendant and his witnesses, 
the prosecutor glicited information that the unemployed defendant 
was arrested in a known narcotics locale while driving an automobile 
that was under investigation by federal narcotics agents and carrying 
$2,600 in cash. The court held that the prosecutor made a conscious 
effort to portray the defendant as an "undesirable" individual engaged 
of prior narcotics trial in related perjury prosecution); United States v. Beasley, 809 
F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987) (proof of other narcotics activities improperly admitted to 
show criminal "pattern" or criminal intent); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 
735 (6th Cir. 1985) (proof of past and possible future crimes should not have been 
admitted to counter defendant's claim of entrapment); United States v. Hodges, 770 
F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1985) (proof of "other crimes" improper under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b)). 
4. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 3-5.6 (2d ed. 1982) (unprofessional 
conduct for prosecutor to offer inadmissible evidence or ask legally objectionable 
questions); see also Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 C m .  L.  BULL. 131 
(1986). 
5. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see also People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 
637 (1950). 
6. See Sorge, 93 N.E.2d at 639. 
7. 628 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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in "all sorts of skulduggery" and likely to be guilty of a s s a ~ l t . ~  Such 
innuendos can be more difficult to refute than direct proof and are 
likely to influence jurors. Convictions obtained when the prosecutor 
attempts to portray the defendant as heavily involved in narcotics or 
other nefarious activities are often r e~e r sed .~  
In a similar fashion, prosecutors manipulate racial attitudes in an 
effort to  destroy a defendant's character. In one murder case, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant: "Now, isn't it true that while you 
were at the [prison] there in Oregon that you led a race riot?"I0 In 
another case, a felony murder conviction was reversed because of the 
prosecutor's "unfounded character assassination" in emphasizing the 
defendant's unemployment, poverty, and receipt of welfare assistance 
during cross-examination.ll Although prior criminal acts not resulting 
in conviction may be used for impeachment purposes,12 one prosecutor 
made a "shambles" of a fair trial by asking the defendant, who was 
charged with burglary, whether he had committed six prior acts of 
breaking into homes when, in fact, all of these incidents had been 
dismissed." When the prior criminal acts are similar to the one that 
forms the basis of the trial, or involve violent or assaultive behavior, 
the potential for prejudice is the greatest; therefore, courts are 
particularly sensitive to such evidence.14 
8. Id. at 57. 
9. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987) (narcotics); United 
States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1985) (narcotics); United States v. 
Creamer, 721 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1983) (other "dangerous" activities); Ross v. Stahl, 
661 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1981) (narcotics); United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (corruption); People v. Sandy, 115 A.D.2d 27, 499 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1986); 
People v. Stewart, 92 A.D.2d 226, 459 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1983) (robbery suspect questioned 
regarding possible use of narcotics); People v. Brown, 70 A.D.2d 1043, 417 N.Y.S.2d 
560 (1979) (sexual misconduct); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571, 487 A.2d 
346 (1985) (murder suspect questioned regarding possible dealings in narcotics); see 
also People v. Brocato, 17 Mich. App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969) (general character 
assassination). 
10. United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir. 1972); see also McBride v. 
State, 338 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (reference to defendant's racial 
epithets upon being arrested). 
11. People v. Andrews, 88 Mich. App. 115, 276 N.W.2d 867 (1979). 
12. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
13. Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'g 423 F. Supp. 53 
(W.D.N.C. 1976). 
14. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (emphasizes 
safeguards), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Williams v. Henderson, 451 F. Supp. 
328 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974). 
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Guilt by Association 
Showing that a defendant associates with unsavory characters may 
not be used to prove guilt." "That one is married to, associated 
with, or in the company of a criminal does not support the inference 
that the person is a criminal or shares the criminal's knowledge."16 
The courts strongly disapprove of prosecutorial attempts to link the 
defendant to other criminals for the explicit purpose of insinuating 
his guilt; accordingly, several convictions have been reversed." Cu- 
rative instructions cannot always repair the damage from egregious 
violations of this rule.ls Thus, courts have held that evidence of a 
son,I9 brother,z0 husband,21 friend,zz or confederatez3 having been 
convicted of crimes was irrelevant when deliberately elicited by the 
prosecutor in an effort to imply the defendant's guilt merely by his 
association with the miscreant. 
In United States v.  R o ~ o , ~ ~  the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed a conviction of conspiracy to distribute narcotics 
based on use of this tactic. Although the defendant testified that he 
had engaged in a few brief and innocent encounters with two ac- 
quaintances, during cross-examination the prosecutor asked whether 
the defendant knew that these persons had been convicted of several 
drug-related offenses. The prejudicial nature of this tactic has caused 
the reversal of several convictions, despite the defendant's "opening 
15. United States v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1021 (1982); United States v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Gerry v. United States, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. 
Crawford, 438 F.M 441 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gosser, 339 F.2d 102, 112 
(6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); see also People v. Forchalle, 88 
A.D.2d 645, 450 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1982). 
16. United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1980). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982); 
United States v. Ochoa, 609 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Labarbera, 
581 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Crawford, 438 F.M 441 (8th Cir. 
1971). 
18. United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1982). 
19. United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1978). 
20. United States v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1021 (1982). 
21. United States v. Rodriquez, 573 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). 
22. United States v. Ochoa, 609 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Turcotte, 
515 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975). 
23. United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1982). 
24. Id. 
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the door" to such proof on his direct examinati~n.~S When proof of 
criminal associations is relevant to an issue in the case and does not 
cast guilt on the defendant, however, the conviction will not be 
disturbed.26 
Improper Use of Prior Convictions 
One of the most volatile areas of prosecutorial abuse is the cross- 
examination of the defendant regarding his prior criminal record. 
Because "cross-examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested,"27 
the rules of evidence entitle the prosecutor to impeach the defendant 
by proof of prior conv i c t i~ns .~~  This method of impeachment is 
predicated on the tenuous and unverified assumption that a person 
who has disobeyed the law in the past will disregard his oath to 
testify t r u t h f ~ l l y . ~ ~  The use of prior convictions to impeach credibility 
is a dangerous weapon that can easily be abused. Such evidence has 
an enormous impact on juries.30 Although trial courts invariably 
instruct that evidence of prior convictions must be used only to 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1978) (gun law 
conviction reversed despite fact that defendant and son were observed counting money 
outside a bar after illegal sale of revolver to federal agent); United States v. Vigo, 
435 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (reversal despite fact 
that defendant denied knowing anyone who had been convicted of violating narcotics 
laws). 
26. See Salemme v. Ristaino, 587 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1978). 
27. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 
353 (1974). 
28. FED. R. EVID. 609. Adoption of this Rule by Congress occasioned heavy debate 
and engendered a large amount of controversy. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 
348 @.C. Cir. 1976). Rule 609 assumes that the prior conviction was properly obtained. 
In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that a defendant must take the stand in order to  
complain on appeal about the failure to exclude a prior conviction. This ruling has 
been held to apply to prior convictions on evidentiary grounds. However, a defendant 
need not take the stand in order to complain about prior convictions obtained in 
violation of constitutional guarantees. See Biller v. Lopes, 834 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(prior conviction obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination). 
29. United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); Gertz v. 
Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884); see ako C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE $ 43 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). 
30. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 2, at 160; see also Loper v. Beto, 
405 U.S. 473, 482-83 n.11, 92 S. Ct. 1014, 1018-19 n.11, 31 L. Ed. 26 374, 381 n.11 
(1972). 
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evaluate the defendant's credibility, persons familiar with criminal 
trials know that jurors find such instructions confusing. More im- 
portantly, however, the jurors are likely to deduce from this evidence 
that the defendant is a bad man and, in turn, is probably guilty.31 
Therefore, impeachment by prior convictions is permissible only when 
the prosecutor has a certified record of the conviction or the judge 
rules that the prosecutor has presented sufficiently reliable proof of 
the c o n v i c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Convictions are unqualifiedly allowed as evidence if they relate to 
acts of dishonesty and falsehood; this is true even when multiple 
convictions are involved.33 Otherwise, the trial judge must make a 
preliminary determination of admissibility by weighing the probative 
value against the prejudice.34 References to accusations, arrests, and 
charges that were dismissed are not ~ermi t ted .~ '  In an effort to 
insinuate guilt, rather than expose falsehood, prosecutors have delib- 
erately tried to circumvent the narrow, permissible use of prior 
convictions. Common techniques used to insinuate guilt include in- 
troducing prior convictions that bear no relationship to ~redibility,'~ 
31. See United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor 
has duty to minimize risk of jury impermissibly using such proof); United States v. 
Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting jurors' "mental confusion" from 
standard limiting instructions on use of prior convictions); see also Griswold, The 
Long View, 51 A.B.A. J .  1017, 1021 (1965) ("Is there anyone who doubts what the 
effect of this evidence in fact is on the jury?"). 
32. Reed v. United States, 485 A.2d 613 (D.C. App. 1984). 
33. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 11 11 (1977); United States v. McIntosh, 426 F.2d 
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 938 n.2a (D.C. Cir. 
1967). 
34. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(l); see also United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273 (7th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
867 (1977); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
35. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S. Ct. 213, 93 L. Ed. 168 (1948); 
United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1978); Watkins v. Foster, 570 
F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'g 423 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.N.C. 1976); United States v. 
Pennix, 313 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963). This prohibition should be distinguished from 
situations in which the prosecutor seeks to discredit a character witness called by the 
defendant. In such a case, the prosecutor may refer to prior arrests, indictments, and 
other specific acts not resulting in conviction. See Michelson, 335 U.S. 469; see also 
FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(l). This rule can also be abused. See People v. Kennedy, 47 
N.Y.2d 196, 391 N.E.2d 288, 417 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1979) (prosecutor committed reversible 
error by questioning defendant's character witnesses concerning the criminal acts for 
which defendant was on trial). 
36. United States v. Larsen, 596 F.2d 347, 348 (9th Cir. 1979) (using two prior 
convictions for child molestation in counterfeiting prosecution). 
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misrepresenting the nature or seriousness of the  conviction^,^^ and 
deliberately suggesting that prior guilt can be a basis for inferring 
present Thus, prosecutors have been admonished not to "pair" 
questions about a defendant's previous conviction for an offense 
similar to the offense for which the defendant is charged with questions 
that elicit a general denial of the charged crime.39 For example, one 
prosecutor's cross-examination of a defendant charged with robbery 
took the following form: 
Q: And you wouldn't rob that man, right? 
A: I had no reason to rob when I am working. 
Q: You wouldn't do something like that? 
A: No, I wouldn't. 
Q: But in 1968, you were convicted of six counts of robbery and 
assault with a dangerous weapon, weren't you, on three different 
people?40 
Virtually the identical technique was employed in a narcotics pros- 
ecution when, after the defendant denied supplying drugs, the pros- 
ecutor asked him: 
Q: Is it not true that [the defendant] was convicted on February 
lst, 1972, in the Federal District Court at Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, for possession of cocaine with intent to  distribute co- 
~ a i n e ? ~ '  
Moreover, impeachment through the use of prior convictions involving 
dissimilar crimes is objectionable if a jury would "naturally and 
necessarily" infer that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime 
because he committed past crimes.42 In order to assure the "critical 
balance between permissible and impermissible uses of prior conviction 
evidence,"43 the prosecutor can only inquire into the number of 
37. United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978) (state convictions 
that were thirty-four and fourteen years old erroneously admitted); United States v. 
Pennix, 313 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1963) (referring to "thirty prior convictions," most 
of which were traffic offenses). 
38. United States v. Henry, 528 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1975). 
39. Dorman v. United States, 491 A.2d 455 (D.C. App. 1985) (en banc). 
40. United States v. Carter, 482 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
41. United States v. Henry, 528 F.2d 661, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also People 
v. Gottlieb, 130 A.D.2d 202, 517 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1987) (pairing prior assault of old 
woman during cross-examination of defendant charged with assault of old woman). 
42. Dorman, 491 A.2d 455. 
43. United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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convictions, the nature of the crimes, and when the defendant com- 
mitted the crimes.44 The prosecutor must not attempt to elicit excessive 
details'about the convictions because such proof will "weigh too 
much with the jury and . . . overpersuade them" as to the defendant's 
The potential for inflaming the jury is obvious, particularly 
when the prior convictions are for violent or assaultive crimes, or 
when the prior facts are similar to the ones for which the defendant 
is on 
For example, after eliciting the existence of prior convictions, one 
prosecutor asked the defendant the following series of questions: 
Q: You were indicted for robbery in the first degree, . . . were 
you not? 
. . . .  
Q: Even today, you were indicted for robbery in the first degree? 
. . . .  
Q: All the time it's robbery in the first degree? 
Q: In the course of grabbing her pocketbook, didn't you hit her 
across the side of the head and throw her down a flight of stairs? 
Q: Isn't it a fact that . . . you pointed this gun at a Police 
Officer, and you fired it at him attempting to cause his death?47 
Another prosecutor carefully elicited details of a prior narcotics 
transaction in an effort to  invite "the jury to draw the impermissible 
inference" of the defendant's By the same token, a prosecutor's 
dwelling on the defendant's length of imprisonment for various 
convictions, the periods of freedom between these incarcerations, and 
the defendant's unemployment during these periods will not be held 
to have been committed with an intent to damage the defendant's 
credibility if the convictions, alone, achieved that purpose.49 The 
"obvious significance" of such evidence was to suggest that the 
44. Id.; United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1970). 
45. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218, 93 L. Ed. 
168, 174 (1948). 
46. Watkins v. Foster, 570 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'g 423 F. Supp. 53 
(W.D.N.C. 1976). 
47. Williams v. Henderson, 451 F. Supp. 328, 330-31 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 584 F.2d 
974 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911 (1979); see also People v. Artis, 67 
A.D.2d 981, 413 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1979). 
48. United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1975); see also ~ e o p ~ k  v. 
Steward, 92 A.D.2d 226, 231, 459 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (1983) ("Rarely has this court 
seen a case where the prosecutor has allowed himself or herself to be so led astray 
in the zeal of obtaining a verdict."). 
49. United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1002-04 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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defendant was a "man who had spent most of his young life 
committing crimes and serving time for crimes, rather than being 
gainfully employed. 
Proof of prior convictions may be excluded when the trial judge 
concludes that the prejudice outweighs its probative value.s1 This 
ruling is usually made outside the presence of the jury and before 
the witness t e s t i f i e ~ . ~ ~  Nevertheless, prosecutors find ways to circum- 
vent these rulings. Thus, after the court excluded any reference to 
the defendant's parole status, the prosecutor in State v. Bains3 sought 
to elicit this fact in cross-examining the defendant about the reason 
why he evaded arrest in the following manner: 
Q: Mr. Bain, have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
A: Yes, I have. 
Q: Did that have anything to do with why you avoided Lieutenant 
Thurman? 
[objection by opposing counsel sustained by the court] 
. . . .  
Q: Can I ask you: If you're such a law abiding citizen, why 
you-God damn, didn't stop when you saw sirens or lights behind 
Similarly, in the rape case of People v. C a v a l l e r ~ , ~ ~  the prosecutor 
violated a pretrial ruling that excluded reference to the defendants' 
prior rape charges by deliberately eliciting from the complainant the 
following reason for her reluctance to testify: "The reason I didn't 
want to testify, was because I know that they have both been charged 
before with rape. They have beaten it every time. I say, why should 
I have to humiliate myself."56 The prosecutor acknowledged that his 
conduct was deliberately violative of the court's order." Such behavior 
is contemptuous. Surely, when an outstanding protective order is 
issued, it is a simple task for prosecutors to instruct their witnesses 
not to discuss the forbidden topics. 
50. Id. at 1004. 
51. FED. R. E m .  609(a)(l). 
52. See United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 944 (1982); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 
849 (1974). 
53. 176 Mont. 23, 575 P.2d 919 (1978). 
54. Id. at 921-22. 
55. 71 A.D.2d 338, 422 N.Y.S.2.d 691 (1979). 
56. Id. at 693. 
57. The court found the prosecutor's conduct so outrageous that it barred retrial 
under the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 695. 
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Using a prior conviction obtained in violation of the defendant's 
right to counsel for impeachment is an error of constitutional mag- 
n i t ~ d e . ~ ~  Although courts often find the error harmless,59 impeaching 
a defendant by introducing a prior conviction for which the defendant 
had no counsel has led to reversal.60 It should be noted, however, 
that courts usually find the error harmless when the prosecutor 
impeaches with admissible and valid, as well as invalid, prior con- 
victions .61 
On direct examination, defense counsel is usually permitted to elicit 
the defendant's prior convictions in order to neutralize the prosecutor's 
detrimental use of that i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~  When the defendant opens the 
door to a sensitive area, however, "he cannot expect the same measure 
of protection from cross-examination as when the prosecution initiates 
the Moreover, reference by the defense to matters that 
the prosecutor would be barred from mentioning can invite an 
appropriate prosecutorial re~ponse.~" Dubbed the doctrine of "curative 
admissibility," the rule "operates to prevent an accused from suc- 
cessfully gaining exclusion of inadmissible prosecution evidence and 
then extracting selected pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, 
without the [prosecutor] being able to place them in their proper 
context."65 The doctrine is, nevertheless, "dangerously prone to over- 
An example of the application and misuse of this doctrine is found 
in Middleton v. United States.67 The defendant, facing a robbery 
charge, took the stand and was questioned by his attorney as follows: 
58. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S. Ct. 1014, 31 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1972); 
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967). 
59. Zilka v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Savage, 513 F.2d 
536 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 924 (1976). 
60. See Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976). 
61. See Jones v. Estelle, 622 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 966 (1980); 
Gibson v. United States, 575 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978). 
62. United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Kitt v. United States, 
379 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1977). 
63. United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 311 F. Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 
148, 157, 78 S. Ct. 622, 628, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, 598 ("[Bly her direct testimony [the 
defendant] had opened herself to cross-examination on matters relevantly raised by 
that testimony."), reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 948 (1958). 
64. See C .  MCCORMICK, supra note 29, at $ 57. 
65. United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
66. United States v. McClain, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
67. 401 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1979). 
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[Q]: Why are you on probation? 
[A]: I snatched a lady's pocketbook. 
. . . .  
[Q]: Did you plead guilty or did you go to trial? 
[A]: I plead [sic] guilty. 
[Q]: Why aren't you pleading guilty in this case? 
[A]: Because this isn't my charge, and I don't know nothing 
about it. This isn't my beef.68 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor responded to the defendant's 
irrelevant and improper insinuation with the following question intended 
to explain the defendant's prior guilty plea: 
[Q]: Isn't it a fact that, Mr. Middleton, tnat you struck a 58 year 
old woman in the face and snatched her purse and ran for two 
blocks? Is that the reason why you plead [sic] guilty to the case, 
because you were caught red-handed with the purse in your hand? 
With the woman's purse one block away? Isn't that why you plead 
[sic] 
Although the court condemned the prosecutor's gratuitous reference 
to the defendant's having struck his victim in the face as inflammatory 
and irrelevant, it found that, by improperly referring to the earlier 
plea, the defendant had opened the door to the prosecutor's eliciting 
the circumstances of the prior arrest.70 
Indirect References to Defendant's Criminal Record 
If the defendant does not testify or otherwise put his character in 
issue, the prosecutor is forbidden to  introduce evidence of the defen- 
dant's criminal record." Nevertheless, prosecutors have employed a 
variety of techniques to indirectly elicit such proof. Convictions have 
been overturned, for example, when prosecutors elicited testimony that 
witnesses identified the defendant's picture from "mugshots"or "mug 
68. Id. at 124. 
69. Id. at 125. 
70. Id. at 125-26; see also MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41 (Wyo. 1986) (prosecutor 
properly elicited that defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for dropping more serious 
charges). But see United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant 
opened door to circumstances of prior acquittal, but prosecutor guilty of misconduct 
in insinuating that acquittal resulted from corruption), cert. denied, 456 U . S .  944 
(1982). 
71. FED. R. EVID. 404; see People v. Richardson, 222 N.Y. 103, 118 N.E. 514 
(1917) (defendant's character erroneously attacked even though not in issue). 
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books" in police files on the ground that such evidence discloses the 
defendant's criminal record.72 Furthermore, the introduction of "mug 
shots" is a dangerous practice. When deciding whether to admit these 
"mug shots" into evidence, courts generally examine the following: 
(1) Whether the photographs are necessary for the prosecution's case; 
(2) whether the photographs, if shown to the jury, will "suggest" that 
the defendant has a prior criminal record; and (3) whether the manner 
of introduction draws "particular attention to the source of implications 
or the  photograph^."^^ 
The tactics enumerated above by no means constitute an exhaustive 
list. Other examples of such prejudicial tactics include: introducing in 
evidence a police report that lists the defendant's "B number" and 
asking the witness, over repeatedly sustained objections, the meaning 
of the term "B number";74 proving that the defendant used aliases in 
an effort to insinuate prior involvement with law enforcement au- 
t h ~ r i t i e s ; ~ ~  eliciting testimony from a federal agent to the effect that 
he executed a search warrant against the defendant in order to search 
for firearms that were illegal by virtue of their possession by the 
defendant, a convicted felon;76 introducing testimony from a pawnshop 
owner that the defendant was not qualified to repurchase his pawned 
guns, leaving the unmistakable inference that disqualification resulted 
from the defendant's prior felonies;77 repeatedly eliciting testimony that 
the investigating officers were assigned to the "major offenders unit";78 
72. See, e.g., State v. Mims, 220 Kan. 726, 556 P.2d 387 (1976) (inadvertent and 
unsolicited reference to photo array of "known robbers"); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 
350 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. App. 1961); People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 113 N.E.2d 
841 (1953). But see United States v. Rixner, 548 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.) (use of mug 
shot was harmless error), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); State v. Gutierrez, 93 
N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (1979) (use of mug shot was harmless error). 
73. United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir. 1987); see United 
States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 
487, 494 (2d Cir. 1973). 
74. People v. Mullin, 41 N.Y.2d 475, 362 N.E.2d 571, 393 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1977). 
But see State v. Overton, 337 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1976) (reference to defendant's name 
in "police file" did not suggest criminal record). 
75. People v. Dowdell, 88 A.D.2d 239, 453 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1982); People v. Evans, 
88 A.D.2d 604, 449 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1982) (deliberate reference in order to evade pretrial 
order of preclusion). 
76. People v. McCarver, 87 Mich. App. 12, 273 N.W.2d 570 (1979). But see 
Preston v. State, 615 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1980) (reference to defendant's probation 
officer unintentional and harmless). 
77. Hammond v. State, 139 Ga. App. 820, 229 S.E.2d 685 (1976). 
78. State v. Gamez, 144 Ariz. 178, 696 P.2d 1327 (1985). 
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and asking the defendant, "[Tlhis isn't the first time you have driven 
a getaway car, is it?"79 
Conclusion 
"A criminal trial," Justice Frankfurter once said, "should have the 
atmosphere of the operating room."80 The reality is otherwise, as many 
commentators recognize.gl Courtroom misconduct by prosecutors, par- 
ticularly conduct which seeks to prove the defendant's bad character, 
is one of the most common tactics used to prejudice a defendant. 
Although proof of a defendant's prior criminal, vicious, or immoral 
conduct may occasionally be relevant, such proof will always be 
detrimental to the defendant. Constant vigilance by trial judges, along 
with self-restraint by prosecutors, are essential to ensure a defendant's 
fair trial and a jury verdict based on proof of guilt, not proof of bad 
character. 
79. McBride v. State, 338 So. 2d 567, 568 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); see also 
People v. Sifford, 76 A.D.2d 937, 429. N.Y.S.2d 270 (1980) (prosecutor rhetorically 
asked whether defendant was in the business of sticking up grocery stores). 
80. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 38, 72 S. Ct. 451, 469, 96 L. Ed. 717, 
738 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 931 (1952). 
8 1. See, e.g., Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 
50 TEx. L.  REV. 629 (1972). 
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